New Delhi [India], July 29 (ANI): Geography is an enemy to China's aspirations for a powerful blue-water navy. While one cannot doubt the might of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), China remains hemmed in by a network of islands and land masses that stand in the way of free access to the Pacific Ocean.

Another obstacle for Chinese military domination is its lack of true allies and, correspondingly, a network of military bases around the world it can rely upon in time of need. China's isolation sharply contrasts with its nemesis the USA, which demonstrated its ability to deploy over long distances and to intimately interoperate with allies like Australia and the UK during the recently concluded Exercise Talisman Sabre in Australia.

Geostrategic experts call this natural network of land masses around China the First Island Chain, and it extends from the Japanese mainland and archipelago to Taiwan, the Philippines, before being anchored in the south in Indonesia. This island chain is extremely significant because, if China and the USA go to war over Taiwan, for example, then it would form a critical line of defense to contain China.

Capturing Taiwan is therefore not only a 'patriotic duty' for communist China, but it would immediately give Beijing an open channel into the wider reaches of the Pacific Ocean. There is a Second Island Chain, but it is a chain in name only since it is characterized by vast oceanic stretches. It extends from Japan's outlying volcanic islands, passes through the Mariana Islands (where Guam is the critical hinge), the Caroline Islands, and terminates in western New Guinea.

As it figures out how to more effectively penetrate into the Pacific Ocean, the PLAN has been making more frequent forays into the Western Pacific in recent years. These voyages have a training purpose and they lay down a marker to countries like Japan and the USA that China can sail wherever it pleases.

Perhaps the clearest example of this mindset yet was the exercising of two PLAN aircraft carriers in waters far to the east of Taiwan and the Philippines recently. The first carrier, Liaoning, crossed the First Island Chain from the East China Sea on 27 May, with the Shandong carrier group following suit on 7 June. The latter had sailed from the South China Sea.

Whilst in the Western Pacific, the two carrier groups conducted 'realistic combat training and adversarial drills,' according to China's Ministry of National Defense. Liaoning operated there from 27 May till 19 June, whilst Shandong remained there from 7-22 June. The training included reconnaissance, early warning, counterstrike, anti-surface warfare, air defense, and tactical flights.

From 14-18 June, the two carrier groups likely performed carrier-versus-carrier wargames, with Liaoning presumably acting as the 'blue force' simulating an American carrier strike group. The two carriers remained some 500-600 km apart, just beyond their outermost defensive boundaries, and they performed intensive aircraft sorties. The highest number of daily sorties occurred on 14 June, when 90 take-offs occurred from Liaoning. The two carrier groups had recrossed the First Island Chain by 22 June.

This twin deployment marked three significant 'firsts' for the Chinese military, according to Yu-cheng Chen and K. Tristan Tang in a report published by The Jamestown Foundation think tank in the USA.

Firstly, they asserted, it was the first time two PLAN carriers have sailed simultaneously in the Western Pacific. Japan's Ministry of Defense has recorded 14 previous instances of Chinese aircraft carriers operating in that maritime zone since 2021, but this was the first time the PLAN did so with two carriers.

The second milestone came about since this was the first time a Chinese carrier had voyaged beyond the porous Second Island Chain. This was achieved when Liaoning and her escorts sailed approximately 300 km southwest of Minami-Tori-shima and moved southwest by another 400-500 km the following day. Prior to this, the farthest a PLAN flattop had proceeded was when Liaoning reached 700 km east of Guam in December 2022.

Significantly, Chinese carriers are nowaays foraying farther from home. Last year there were five Chinese carrier deployments, and four of those occurred near the Bashi Channel that separates the Philippines and Taiwan. Yet this year, with four carrier deployments already, all have been longer and more dispersed.

Thirdly, Chen and Tang noted, was the record length of time a Chinese carrier group has conducted operations beyond the First Island Chain. For 27 days, at least one Chinese carrier group was operating in the Western Pacific. Liaoning was there 24 days, whilst Shandong managed 16 days. This accords with the PLAN's desire to expand its training plan and validate training scenarios in maritime areas China previously did not address.

Chen and Tang commented, 'The drills constitute a shift in the PLAN's focus toward long-range operations. This likely stems from an assessment by the PLA's Central Military Commission (CMC) that the navy has achieved sufficient combat capability in the country's near seas.'

The academics continued, 'The PLA has begun to cross the Second Island Chain, which includes Guam, in the Western Pacific. This shift brings Chinese forces closer to Hawaii. As a result, the United States may need to adjust its force deployments and rotation schedules accordingly. In addition, the latest shift could imply that the PLA Navy believes it has secured operational dominance in nearby waters. If so, it likely will engage in more assertive and potentially unsafe behaviour during naval encounters with vessels from neighbouring states in future.'

Chen and Tang highlighted two pertinent points. 'The first is that the PLA has started shifting the focus of its training from near-seas comprehensive operations toward far-seas mobile operations. The second - which follows from the first - is that the CMC likely has determined that the PLA now possesses comprehensive near-seas combat capabilities, such as those needed for operations around Taiwan.'

Far-seas mobile operations ,designed to control key straits, protect sea lines of communication, safeguard China's overseas interests and deter a military crisis, are a challenge for China. This is primarily because China lacks shore-based air support and close-range logistical supply.

This lack of a supporting network forces the PLA to concentrate its naval assets and to perform far-seas raiding and guerilla warfare. This requires speed and effectiveness, as well as early-warning and monitoring capabilities. China is still developing doctrines for far-seas mobile operations, but they are predicated on China comprehensively dominating its near seas first. If the PLA cannot operate freely within the First Island Chain, it does not bode well for missions farther afield. China has already normalized operations around Taiwan, and it seems the PLA is now doing the same in the Western Pacific.

Chen and Tang assessed: 'The PLA Navy's shift in training focus from near-seas to far-seas operations could lead to more direct pressure on the United States. Key US military outposts beyond the mainland - such as Hawaii - could have to contend with increased naval presence by Chinese naval forces operating closer and with greater endurance than before. This development not only challenges the United States' strategic depth in the Pacific, but may also compel it to reconsider its force deployment and readiness posture throughout the Indo-Pacific region.'

Of course, it is helpful to contrast this Chinese carrier activity with that of its adversaries. During Exercise Talisman Sabre, held in and around Australia from 13-27 July, the USA and UK both operated aircraft carriers. The US Navy contributed USS George Washington, while the Royal Navy's HMS Prince of Wales participated in the massive wargames involving 19 nations.

Equipped with F-35 fighters, the two carriers met in the Timor Sea north of Darwin in what they described as a 'powerful demonstration of naval power.' The US carrier was accompanied by a cruiser and destroyer, whilst HMS Prince of Wales was escorted by a multinational flotilla comprising Australian, British, Canadian, New Zealand and Norwegian warships.

Rear Admiral Eric Anduze, Commander of Carrier Strike Group Five, spoke to ANI from his flagship USS George Washington shortly after the multinational exercise kicked off. He stated, 'We participate in Talisman Sabre 25 in order to rehearse, join and combine operations with our Australian counterparts, demonstrate maneuverability of naval forces in a contested environment, and increase operability and lethality.'

Asked about the importance of such wargames, Anduze shared, 'We rehearse our tactics and communications, how we operate and how Australia operates, how we communicate and how we integrate across multiple domains. All of these experiences increase interoperability and strengthen our alliance as a whole for the security and freedom of the Indo-Pacific.'

He elaborated on the importance of allies and interoperability: 'The US conducts routine operations in this area of operations to ensure freedom of navigation, a free and open Indo-Pacific that's resilient and prosperous for all. And we have to do it with allies and partners in order to be successful and have the most impact. So anytime we have the ability to share, coordinate and work together, it's a chance for our tactics to become more refined and for us to be able to come together quickly.'

ANI asked whether aircraft carriers like USS George Washington have become vulnerable. Anduze asserted that aircraft carriers 'are still the most survivable airfield in the world. As time has evolved, threats have changed, and we've adjusted our tactics with the times in order to become more survivable. We have defense in depth, technology and tactics that help us protect this vessel, and all of the assets that sail with or around her throughout the entire area of operations.'

The commander further noted: 'Submarine and missile technologies have evolved over the years, and aircraft technology has evolved over the years. It's a game of what technology does the enemy possess, and what technologies can we develop to counter those things, whether it's new aircraft like the F-35 and its stealth capabilities, better defense missiles, adjustments to our Aegis system and its ability to intercept incoming threats.'

He assured, 'We're evolving and adjusting. And that's the technical piece of it, but there's also the tactical piece. I can't go into specifics of how we've changed our tactics to improve the security of the aircraft carrier, but we're always evolving. We're always assessing the threat and our capabilities, developing technologies and looking for ways to integrate those.'

Indeed, a major portion of these developing threats is the PLA, which has developed weapons like the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, DF-17 hypersonic missile and modern conventional and nuclear-powered submarines.

As another example of the interoperability being achieved by Five Eyes partners - Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and USA - the Australian military rearmed a Canadian warship in Darwin during Talisman Sabre 2025. HMCS Ville de Quebec received RGM-84 Harpoon Block II missiles on two occasions. This proves the ability of partners to rearm each other far from home, thanks to common weapons. China, which has few close military allies, cannot compete with such an ability.

Yet more interoperability occurred when two US Air Force pilots flew Australian F-35A fighters during Talisman Sabre 2025. This 'interfly' activity illustrated the close bonds between countries like the USA and Australia.

One of the aviators involved, Major Justin Lennon of the USAF, noted, 'In the long term, as a coalition, normalizing interfly gives commanders additional options for agility and versatility in a future conflict. In a prolonged conflict, airplanes are capable of flying more hours a day than a pilot. Having the added flexibility to put any pilot in any F-35 and generate combat airpower anywhere in the world adds to the F-35 coalition's lethality.'

China is working hard to extend its reach and to project power far from home shores. However, Beijing's ability to do so remains its obvious weakness, especially when one compares China's solitary status with the network of alliances and partnerships that the USA has forged in the Indo-Pacific region over decades. (ANI)